A grand compromise on carbon taxes (11-13-08)
Reform the Tax Code Now (3-8-10)
Top Tax Rate Fallacies (12-7-10)
How to reform the corporate tax code (12-15-10)
A grand compromise on carbon taxes (11-13-08)
Reform the Tax Code Now (3-8-10)
Top Tax Rate Fallacies (12-7-10)
How to reform the corporate tax code (12-15-10)
Financial Planning with Purpose (10-15-10)
Get Rich, Slowly (10-28-10)
Dad-folio: The Essential Financial and Legal Tools Every Dad Must Own (11-11-10)
Is My House a Good Investment? (11-30-10)
Are You Your Biggest Investment? (12-19-10)
Where to Put Your Money: The Basics (12-29-10)
Simple Rules for Investing in Stocks (1-13-11)
Investing in Bonds – Keep it Simple (1-19-11)
You Need Skills to Pay the Bills (2-17-11)
Why the Fed Likes Inflation (And What it Means to You) (2-25-11)
The Federal Reserve recently announced that it would purchase up to $600 billion of US Treasury bonds in a program known as "quantitative easing", which is a fancy way of saying "printing money". This is actually the second bout of quantitative easing since the financial crisis, and thus this round has earned the nickname "QE2". The policy of printing money is a blunt economic instrument, with wide range of consequences, known and unknown. The announcement of the policy has attracted no shortage of critics, from World Bank President Robert Zoellick, to Sarah Palin, to the leaders of Germany, Japan, China and Brazil. All deride it as inflationary currency manipulation.
The Fed's ultimate goal is to prevent a Japan-like malaise of falling prices and shrinking consumption from infecting the United States. With short-term interest rates at zero, the Fed can't lower short-term rates any further. By printing money to buy longer-dated treasury bonds, the Fed accomplishes two things. First, by increasing the supply of money, it decreases the value of the dollar which helps create positive inflation. Second, by reducing interest rates of "risk-free" investments like cash and treasuries to below the rate of inflation, those investments become money-losers in inflation-adjusted terms. The goal is to bribe savers to shift investments from cash and treasuries into "risky" investments like corporate debt, equities and real estate and also into near term consumption of goods and services.
Pushing on a string in the US
There are three major problems with this policy. Americans are unlikely to increase their consumption markedly, given that they are determined to rebuild their savings after years of under-saving. In addition, real estate suffers from a massive debt overhang and isn't likely to truly recover for years. Businesses will gradually increase their investment, but generally act in their own interest and can't be forced into making investments they wouldn't otherwise make. For these reasons, the Fed's war on domestic savings will not likely be successful. In economics parlance, the Fed is "pushing on a string". Instead, we are seeing a shift of savings from investments that have a negative real rate of return (like cash and bonds) and into those that are considered inflation hedges like precious metals and commodities like oil, wheat and cotton.
Taking the fight to China
The second front in the Fed's war on savings is against the biggest saver in the world: the Chinese government. The Chinese government has systematically manipulated the world trade markets by recycling its export earnings into US dollar-denominated assets instead of into US-dollar imports. By mathematical equation, this results in a trade surplus in China and a trade deficit in the US. In the past decade, China has accumulated over $2 trillion of US-dollar reserves. By increasing the supply of US Treasuries and by holding interest rates below the rate of inflation, the US is essentially taxing Chinese savings. The weak dollar also pushes up the currencies of countries that compete with China, not only those of emerging market economies, but also currencies like the Japanese Yen and the Euro. China, Japan, Brazil, Korea, etc. have all been using export promotion policies like currency suppression to enrich themselves at the expense of exporters from the United States. The Fed is finally saying "Two can play at that game".
The current long-term trend of artificially-suppressed interest rates, a weaker dollar and higher commodities will play out until the world cries "uncle!". No one knows when this will happen, but when it does, the current trends will be reversed.
Economic growth ahead
The Fed has clearly learned the lessons of the Great Depression and of Japan. The TARP and the first round of quantitative easing were designed to prevent a second Great Depression, and were successful. QE2 is designed to prevent a repeat of the past two decades of deflationary malaise in Japan from occurring in the United States. If the Fed is determined to prevent deflation, they will. The downside, because there is no "free lunch" in economics, is a weaker currency on a relative basis (next to other paper currencies), and on an absolute basis (relative to precious metals and commodities). The decline in the dollar pushes up the prices of imported consumer goods and commodity products like food and gas, even while overall inflation may be tame. This hurts low-to-middle income Americans most of all.
Fixed Income
Looking at the interest rate complex, we can see that treasury rates are far below their equilibrium levels, with the exception of the 30-year treasury. Treasury Inflation-Protected Securities are showing negative yields right now, which is a sign that investors expect the Fed to be successful at maintaining positive inflation. The 30-year, which is the least manipulated issue on the curve, is expecting inflation to average 2.6% over the next 30 years, which is over the Fed's target range.
Source: Vanguard Funds, Bloomberg Treasury Rate Data, tylernewton.com
These rates are even lower than what prevailed at the time of my last post on July 11, 2010 (when I declared that there was not much more fun to be had in the fixed income markets…oh well).
So while the treasury complex is artificially over-priced, risk assets like corporate bonds, high yield bonds, muni bonds and equities are priced at above-equilibrium "spreads" over treasury rates, even if nominal yields are below equilibrium levels. If you are a long-only investor, it would be better to keep your fixed income investments in less-volatile shorter term maturities. If you are the type of investor that can short the appropriate treasury while going long on corporate, high yield and municipal bonds, you can enjoy better-than-equilibrium returns.
Equities
The rise in long-term inflation expectations explains the rise in the equity market since July.
Implied market returns
7/11/10
11/8/10
The implied long term return on equities is 2.4 percentage points higher than the yield on the 30-year treasury, versus an equilibrium spread of 2.3 percentage points. (This equilibrium spread is based on an after-tax equilibrium spread of 4.5 percentage points above the after-tax return on the 30-year treasury. Because equities are more tax efficient than treasury debt, the nominal equilibrium spread shrinks to 2.4 percentage points.) Note that I use a lower spread than the 6% or so often used in valuation textbooks.
Equities are a decent buy at this point if you believe that the Federal Reserve's policy of quantitative easing will be successful at increasing long term inflation expectations, weakening the dollar and supporting economic growth. So far the price of the 30-year treasury bond and equities are telling you that the market thinks that quantitative easing will be successful.
The Dollar
The value of the dollar also shows that the market believes that quantitative easing will be successful.
Major Currencies Index (nominal)
Broad Currencies Index (real)
Source: economy.com
Both measures of the dollar index are trading at the bottom of their long term ranges, which means that further upside in foreign currency trades may be limited.
Gold and commodities
Source: economy.com
Both gold and commodities reflect the effects of quantitative easing.
On a relative basis, oil and other commodities are cheap relative to gold.
Source: economy.com, calculations by tylernewton.com
Conclusion: A crowded trade?
In the past week (November 8-12), the QE2 trade has been reversing itself. Treasury yields and the dollar have been rising and gold and stocks have been falling, reflecting a classic "buy the rumor, sell the news" situation. The QE2 rally reflected a liquidity-driven rally, where everything except the dollar (stocks, bonds, commodities, and foreign currencies) goes up, and since November 8, we've had a classic withdrawal of liquidity trade, with everything except the dollar going down. This is different from a crisis trade, during which treasury bonds would also rally.
Possible reasons for the break in the markets this week:
The balance of risks tells me that the markets are likely transitioning from a liquidity-driven phase to a phase that will discount moderate-to-strengthening economic growth. Such a scenario would favor equities and commodities and support the spreads of risk assets over treasuries. The valuation level of domestic equities is relatively high, however.
QE2 will continue to drive investors into emerging markets, which will likely to blow a bubble in emerging markets stocks and commodities. I don't think emerging markets stocks are cheap, but the "story" will likely stay favorable for some time.
Action plan
As the current market pullback runs its course, I will likely trim a few of my precious metals (gold and silver) positions and add other commodities (a net neutral change in the commodity weighting for the whole portfolio). I will trim a bit of my foreign bond positions (which I added last quarter) and add foreign stocks. I remain neutral/underweight domestic equities at levels above $1,000 on the S&P 500. I remain neutral on bond duration in the US.
Waiting for "regime change"
I suspect we are in the last phase of "casino capitalism" in the international capital markets. While the leaders of the G-20 couldn't agree to anything last week, it is only a matter of time before the international currency and trade system slams into a wall of nationalism. At that point, international regulation of currencies, trade flows, bank leverage and hedge funds will become widely accepted to save the real economy from the whims of the financial economy. The financial system is meant to serve the real economy, not the other way around. The transition to the new system will be messy, so stay on guard in the meantime. Be conservative in your investment decisions, don't be afraid to hold cash and don't be a hero. I still have a strong suspicion that the best investment opportunity still lies ahead.
I am not a financial advisor, and write these columns for personal enjoyment only. Please consult your own investment advisor before acting on any recommendations you find on the internet.
As a dad, you’ve got a lot on your plate. From picking insurance to paying for your children’s education, you have some serious decisions to make. If you’re looking for some answers to those important questions, take a look at my Dad-Folio. I included financial and legal tools that can make great additions to any dad’s tool kit.
This article by Tyler Newton can be found at the site "Man of the House" HERE.
On Tuesday, the Democrats face a major shellacking. Looking at online betting site Intrade, the GOP has a greater than 90% chance of taking control of the House of Representatives where it is favored to pick up 55-60 seats. The Republicans also look likely to pick up 8-10 Senate seats (it needs 10 to take control of the Senate). The GOP appears to be a lock to pick up currently democratic seats in Arkansas, Colorado, Illinois, Indiana, Nevada, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin. Washington and West Virginia are within reach for the GOP, but are favored to remain in Democratic hands. The GOP appears to also have a lock on open GOP-held Senate seats in Alaska, Kentucky, Florida, Missouri, New Hampshire and Ohio. Considering that the Senate seats up for election this year were last elected in the strong Republican year of 2004, gaining this many seats would be quite a feat. In the next two cycles, the Democrats will be defending the wave of seats they won in 2006 and 2008, many of which are in conservative states.
Such an outcome would pretty much bury my theory, posited here and here, that the 2008 election was a "realigning election", ushering in a new era of Democratic dominance. It seemed like a good theory at the time. Obama had a robust agenda and Congressional majorities to back him up while the GOP was generally befuddled, with weak leadership and unclear agenda. The turnaround in the GOP's fortunes has been remarkable, but is explainable. The problem is that neither party has a platform that truly appeals to the middle class. Middle class voters are seeing that the Obama administration has ramped up spending on programs that haven't benefitted them in any way outside of the most abstract sense. In addition, the Tea Party has allowed the GOP to rebrand themselves as fiscal conservatives after years of fiscal laxity under the Bush administration. Obama's problem isn't his inability to promote his platform or irrational rage on the part of the pesky electorate. Obama is suffering from the same structural flaw that has hindered Democratic politics for the past thirty years: failing to present a positive agenda for the middle class.
How to build a successful political coalition
The American electorate can be divided into four groups, two elite groups and two populist (Jacksonian) groups. Right-leaning elites, known as Hamiltonians, tend to vote on fiscal or business issues. Left-leaning elites, known as Jeffersonians, tend to vote on social issues. Jacksonians tend to be economically populist and socially conservative. Right-leaning Jacksonians tend to be suspicious of big government and big business, and are fiercely independent. The Tea Party voters are examples of right-leaning Jacksonians, many of whom were likely Ross Perot voters in the early 1990s. Left-leaning Jacksonians tend to be more communitarian than their right-leaning counterparts, and are often the classic union or machine-politics voters from the urban ethnic North.
Lasting political coalitions tend to marry one of the elite groups with one of the Jacksonian groups and then use wedge issues to peel off a chunk of the opposite elite and Jacksonian group. The wedge issues have to pit subsets of the opposition coalition against one another. Obama the (Jeffersonian) candidate did a good job of winning over a good chunk of Hamiltonians, particularly those in the technology and manufacturing industries and those that would benefit from his clean energy agenda. Obama and the Democrats courted the financial industry, even though it was clear that they were going to implement strong financial regulations. He co-opted many elements of the normally Republican-leaning health care industry into supporting his health reform. In other instances, he has used regulations to hobble Republican industries like for-profit education and energy extraction. His stimulus was geared toward supporting his base in public-sector unions, as well as by spending on clean energy and health care technology. If the electorate consisted of no one but elites and public sector employees, it was a pretty clever strategy. Unfortunately for president Obama, the Democrats have done virtually nothing to fire up the Jacksonian base.
The Democrats' political misfire
One of the great conceits of the Democratic Party is that middle class voters that vote Republican are voting against their own economic interest. The basic subtext is that middle class voters are so dumb, or racist, or homophobic, or jingoistic, or angry or afraid that they are repeatedly tricked by the billionaires that back the "Republican attack machine" from embracing the party that has their best interests at heart. (Obama himself continues to blame the voters for their own ignorance.) There never seems to be the introspection that calling the voters stupid may not be politically astute. Or that maybe there is something wrong with the Democratic agenda in the first place.
The Democrats used to be a positive force for the middle class, implementing programs like Social Security, the GI Bill, support for housing finance, and Medicare. Since the late 1960s, however, the agenda has been much more tilted to serve rich liberals and the poor.
Health care is a prime example. Most middle class voters have health insurance, but feel that it is too costly and too complicated. Obama's health reform was more focused on extending coverage to the working poor. To pay for that extension, the bill cut Medicare (a middle class benefit), reduced the tax deduction for "Cadillac" plans (often a union benefit), and raised fees and regulations on small businesses. It was wildly expensive, yet the Obama administration used blatant slight-of-hand to pretend that it paid for itself. The average voter can correctly assume that their health care costs will now accelerate and eat into their wages. In exchange they receive not-so-exciting benefits like being able to keep your kids on your insurance until they turn 26. Universal health care is to the Democrats as the white whale is to Captain Ahab. Even though the economy and housing markets faced, and continue to face, huge problems, the Democrats instead chased the ideological white whale.
The stimulus is another example. The $700 billion price tag delivered no tangible benefits to the average voter. Even though it probably did prevent things from getting worse, it was probably spent in the least politically advantageous way possible. It transferred money to irresponsible state governments to keep their bloated payrolls afloat, which felt like a political payoff for the Democrats' public union supporters. The rest was spent on behind-the-scenes technology investments like green energy projects, electronic medical records and vanity projects like high-speed rail that won't be built for years. I actually think most of these items are decent things to spend money on, but they appeal mostly to eggheads like me. The rest of the country was left scratching their heads at what exactly we spent $700 billion on. To make matters worse, even the tax cuts in the bill somehow escaped the notice of the electorate.
The TARP, of course, was the most egregious self-inflicted wound by the political class. While I can defend the TARP intellectually, the politicians absolutely should not have let it seem like a scot-free bailout for the bankers in charge. While the Bush Administration implemented the first part of the TARP program, the GOP in Congress largely voted against it. They can thus credibly take credit for rejecting TARP with the voters, who view the TARP as an un-American bailout of the politically connected. The voters are basically right about this. The Democratic Party has been courting the financial industry for decades and didn't want to cross the bankers by reining in their pay or power. In fact, the largest banks became even bigger and more powerful during the crisis, while small banks (and small business lending) were left to suffer.
So we have more than $2 trillion spent on the TARP, the stimulus and the health care bill with very little tangible benefit for the middle class. The TARP and the stimulus have undoubtedly helped the economy, but the average voter can credibly wonder if that $1.5 trillion could have been better spent. To make matters worse, the political class got sidetracked on a health care reform that has more downside than upside for middle class voters.
Voting for divided government
The voters are not necessarily looking to put the GOP back in charge. They still mostly blame the Bush Administration for the financial crisis. They just look at the Democrats' agenda and think it needs to be reined in. By taking away the Democrats' control of congress, they put an end to an unsuccessful bout of one-party rule and replace it with divided government. Divided government is better for cutting the deficit and forcing more moderate compromise. It doesn't matter what the Republicans did when they were in charge. The voters are forward-looking. Obama is still president, so we aren't returning to one-party Republican rule. The Republicans don't have a positive economic agenda for the middle-class either. The future is wide open for both parties.
The American electorate as a whole is actually very smart. They have historically made the right choices between the choices that they have had. Obama needs to be reined in, so they will vote Republican in the mid-terms. How 2012 turns out will depend on how the parties act in the next two years. 2010 isn't necessarily a Republican victory any more than it is a Democratic defeat. The middle class is still looking for its long-lost champion.
Slow and steady wins the race in investing. For every successful get-rich-quick hare, there are a thousand that end up road kill. Emulate the tortoise instead. Follow these five rules for slow and steady wealth-building:
This article by Tyler Newton can be found at the site "Man of the House" HERE.
Set goals and achieve them. You have probably heard this your whole life, but when it comes to financial planning, setting goals and a vision is imperative to your success. By balancing the four pillars in your life – career, family, hobbies and community – your goals are clearer and become something to work toward. Once you set a long-term life plan, your financial goals become a lot easier to obtain.
This article by Tyler Newton can be found at the site "Man of the House" HERE.
The following post is the second in my "United States of Debt" series that analyzes how the different sectors of the US economy will handle their high debt loads. The first installment can be found here.
During the housing bubble, American consumers loaded up on debt. Since the bursting of the bubble, Americans have adjusted by increasing their savings and paying down debt. This adjustment resulted in a slight decrease in consumer spending and a large decrease in residential investment. My analysis shows that the bulk of the adjustment in consumer spending is complete. The level of personal savings is driven by household net worth. As a percent of GDP, both household net worth and savings have returned to normal levels. Therefore if asset values can remain elevated, consumer spending can at least keep pace with normal levels of GDP growth for the foreseeable future.
As has been discussed previously in the Dynamist, a big secular trend over the past forty years has been the rise in consumer spending and residential investment as a percent of GDP.
Figure 1
Source: Economy.com, tylernewton.com
As has also been discussed previously (namely here), virtually all of the long term increase in consumer spending can be attributed to the rise in (mostly non-voluntary) medical expenses and housing investment. Virtually all of the decline in household spending as a percent of GDP since 2005 can be attributed to the decline in residential investment from 6% of GDP to less than 2.5% of GDP.
Not surprisingly, consumer indebtedness climbed to support the increase in spending (particularly since personal income has not risen as a percent of GDP…to be discussed in a later post).
Figure 2
Source: Economy.com, tylernewton.com
Also not surprisingly, the amount of consumer debt has started to decline with residential investment, albeit with a lag.
The increase in consumer debt shown in Figure 2 seems kind of scary until you compare that consumer debt with the amount of consumer assets.
Figure 3
Source: Economy.com, tylernewton.com
From 1994 to 2005, household assets as a percent of GDP rose from under 425% of GDP to over 550%. With asset values surging, household net worth (assets minus liabilities) also surged, even with the large increase in liabilities. Figure 4 below illustrates the effects of the twin bubbles in stocks (in the 1990s) and real estate (in the 2000s) on household assets.
Figure 4
Source: Economy.com, tylernewton.com
Looking at Figure 3, it appears that the preferred level of household net worth is about 350% of GDP, although it would make sense for this number to rise somewhat over the next decade as the baby boomers prepare for retirement. If we look at the long term levels of personal savings in Figure 5 and compare it to the long term levels of net worth in Figure 3, a pattern emerges.
Figure 5
Source: Economy.com, tylernewton.com
When household net worth is around its long term trend of 350%, personal savings averages 4-6% of GDP. In the high inflation, high interest rate 1970s, when asset values were depressed, net worth dipped down toward 300% of GDP and savings rose above 6%. During the asset bubbles of the late 1990s and early 2000s, net worth rose well above 350% of GDP and savings fell below 4%. After the housing bubble burst, net worth fell back to 350% and savings promptly popped to above 4% of GDP.
Now that savings is at a normal level, consumer spending has the ability to keep pace with GDP growth. That does not mean that consumers won't choose to keep increasing their saving rates over the next decade, particularly the baby boomers as they prepare for retirement. As long as the savings rate as a percent of GDP exceeds the nominal growth rate of GDP, consumer indebtedness as a percent of GDP will decline.
Thus we see the importance of keeping interest rates low and preventing asset deflation. Financial assets like stocks and bonds fall in value when interest rates spike. Assets geared to inflation like stocks and real estate fall when you have deflation. The Fed will see propping up asset values to prevent another major spike in the consumer savings rate as a high priority for the foreseeable future. A spike in the savings rate would reduce final demand, which in turn would force the federal government to spend more money to prop up demand.
The S&P 500 has fallen 9.2% since my last update on April 16. The decline has been driven by a large shift in long-term inflation expectations, which have declined from 2.7% to 2.3% today (as determined by the 30-year spread between treasury rates and 30-year inflation-protected securities, or TIPS). This is consistent with the news coverage surrounding the European debt crisis, which has been raising deflation fears in the markets. As a result, the 10-year treasury yield has fallen from 3.8% to 3.1%. The dollar has risen, gold has been steady and commodities have fallen, all consistent with the global slowdown scenario.
Equities
With the decline in the assumed inflation rate, stocks are pricing in a 6.4% long term return, based on long term trend earnings of $58.40.
This return is below the target return of 6.8%. To produce a 6.8% return for today's assumed level of inflation (which coincides with what the Fed targets, so it's a good equilibrium assumption), you would need to see a S&P 500 level of 945.
Fixed Income
There's not much more fun to be had on the fixed income side of the house.
Unfortunately, everything is overvalued with the exception of long term munis, which are roughly fairly priced. The only way to get excited about bonds right now is to have conviction that we're headed into a deflationary double-dip recession.
I don't have that conviction. I'm more in the camp expecting that we'll stumble through a subpar recovery, with the economy weighed down by deleveraging in the consumer and real estate markets. If I had to put new money to work in the US, I would either keep it safe in cash or short term bonds for deployment later or I would buy stocks out of a lack of better options, where we could see a bit of a rebound as people realize the world isn't relapsing into recession.
The dollar
Major currency index – nominal
The dollar has rallied against the Euro and other major currencies recently, trading to the top of its long-term (downward-trending) trading range. This creates an opportunity to cycle some money out of US fixed income (like corporate debt or TIPS) and into foreign stocks and bonds.
Commodities
I'm not sure what to make of commodities. Commodities, as represented by the CRB futures index, are cheap relative to gold but expensive relative to consumer prices.
For all we know, gold could be overvalued, so I'm not enthusiastic about recommending buying commodities.
Housing
Housing prices are still a bit higher than their long-run, inflation-adjusted equilibrium level of about 100. Given how high prices were away from equilibrium during the boom, and that prices and sales are being actively propped up by the government currently, there is a great danger that prices can overshoot to the downside if the market relapses, which it easily could. My hunch is that commercial real estate is in even worse shape than residential.
Conclusion
Outside of taking advantage of the strong dollar to allocate some money into foreign stocks and bonds, I'm at a loss to get excited about any particular asset class. Not a bad time to take some bond profits and build up some cash. Cash may pay zero percent right now, but that's better than losing money.
This column is written purely for the author's pleasure. I am not a financial advisor. Please consult your own financial advisor before acting on any investment recommendations.
The economy of the United States is highly leveraged. Through the boom times of the 1980s through the 2000s, total US private and public debt to GDP has risen sharply. Since the 2008-2009 recession, private debt has started to fall while public debt has risen, while the country's total indebtedness has remained relatively stable. Most US citizens have the nagging feeling that our debt burden has gotten too high. If we know that debt to GDP needs to come down, however, we don't know to what level it should come. I have decided to analyze this issue in a series of posts called "The United States of Debt".
In this the first installment, I will run through the big picture. The first section discusses how the recent run-up is not surprising in the context of the long cycle, and that we have seen these financial booms before, during the Gilded Age following the Civil War and during the Roaring Twenties. The second section dissects the recent debt buildup between the private, public and financial sectors. The last section discusses why the recent financial boom has been so long lasting and powerful relative to the Gilded Age and Roaring Twenties.
The next three installments will analyze the financial health of the Household, Business and Government sectors and to make policy recommendations on how to promote the financial health of those sectors.
The long wave debt cycle
It's no secret that the United States has a debt problem. This long term chart of total, economy-wide debt to GDP demonstrates it pretty well.
Chart 1
The long term pattern of debt peaks corresponds with the long wave, or Kondratiev Cycle (for a more detailed description of this concept, see here). During the "autumn" phase of the "financial bull", inflation is falling, thus interest rates are falling and asset values are rising. While asset values are rising, the cost of borrowing is falling, which creates a perfect environment for using leverage for investment, whether in the financial markets, real estate markets or for corporate investment.
Eventually, the asset bubble pops, marking the transition to the "winter" phase, or the "real bear". It is at the bottom of the first winter recession that the debt-to-GDP ratio peaks (previously in 1875 and 1933). Why? Because as asset values start to fall, the high level of underlying debt results in a deflationary spiral of forced asset sales and financial failures. Nominal GDP falls while the level of debt remains roughly the same (or rises).
Eventually, the economy bottoms and debt-to-GDP turns down. The decline in debt-to-GDP comes from a combination of rising real GDP, rising inflation (which reduces debt in real terms) and debt destruction trough defaults.
Chart 2
At the beginning of the Great Depression in 1929, the bulk of US debt was corporate debt tied to the investment bubble in auto manufacturing, electric utilities, houshold appliances, radio and other sectors that made up the "new economy" of the Roaring Twenties. Corporate debt to GDP collapsed from over 100% in 1933 to under 30% by the mid-1940s. Household debt fell from 50% of GDP in 1933 to roughly 15% in the same time period. Much of the drop in total debt to GDP came during the 1933-1936 period, when the dollar was devalued by 50% and economic growth was very high (albeit from an extremely low base). The ratio rose again when the economy relapsed in 1937-38, but resumed its decline when the economy recovered modestly in the pre-war years. The end of the long depression years came when government debt to GDP began to expand during World War II in the early 1940s. Government debt to GDP balooned from under 50% to about 100% of GDP during World War II, while private debt to GDP declined.
Total non-financial debt to GDP remained between 125% and 140% from the end of World War II to the early 1980s. During that time, government debt to GDP fell from about 100% to 40%, while private non-financial debt rose from 40% to 100% by 1980. During the same time, financial debt to GDP rose from under 5% to about 20% by 1980, returning to roughly the same level that prevailed in the late 1920s.
The consumer and financial debt explosion since 1980
Table 1
Table 1 above walks us through how our debt load has evolved since the early 1980s. For the sake of cyclical consistency, I show the recession years of 1982, 1990, 2001 and the recent recession trough of Q2 2009. There has been a steady increase in private sector debt, particularly among households and the financial sector. During each business cycle, the private sector tacked on 50-60 percentage points of indebtedness. The government sector, on the other hand, has see-sawed in a one-cycle-up, one-cycle-down pattern.
The largest increase in indebtedness has come from the financial sector, having increased by 93 percentage points between 1982 and 2009. As can been seen in Chart 2, about half of that increase came from the Government Sponsored Entities ("GSEs"), namely Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. That debt has from a practical standpoint become government debt as well.
Since the 2009 recession has ended, total debt to GDP is has declined by three percentage points. Private sector debt has dropped by 14 percentage points while government debt has risen by 11 percentage points. So far the government has been filling the classic Keynesian deflation-fighting role by borrowing and spending to offset a decline in private borrowing and spending.
The problem with this analysis so far is that while interesting, it doesn't mean a lot without knowing what the optimal debt to GDP level is. Just because debt to GDP used to be 150%, doesn't mean that was the right level. In fact, for all we know, 150% was way too conservative and presented a great opportunity to lever up to the optimal level north of 300%. My gut tells me that the truth lies somewhere in between these two extremes.
The Second Gilded Age
So what happened in the period from 1980 to 2009 that led to an explosion of US indebtedness? We have had a confluence of factors that created the ideal environment for the greatest bull market in the history of the world:
With the devaluation of the dollar (also known as "inflation"), the denominator in which the S&P 500 is quoted has declined, providing a lift to the nominal value of the S&P. That said, however, over the past 50 years, the price of gold and the S&P have merely kept pace with each other (see Chart 3). Since 1955, 100% of the excess return of the S&P 500 over gold is attributable to dividends.
Chart 3
Source: economy.com, Standard and Poors, tylernewton.com
Or looking at it another way, Chart 4 shows the S&P 500 expressed in terms of ounces of gold.
Chart 4
Source: economy.com, Standard and Poors, tylernewton.com
If you ignore the outlying years of 1997 to 2001, the pattern is pretty clear: a steady buildup to about 3 ounces of gold before the plunge to below 1. The only question now is how low the ratio goes. The previous bottom was 0.22 in 1980. That would imply the S&P falling to 265 at today's price of gold, or conversely, gold rising to 4,881 at today's level of S&P.
Nevertheless, since 1955, the price of gold has risen from $35 to $1,205 and the S&P 500 has risen from $35 to $1074. The ratio of S&P 500 to gold seems to spend 15-18 years above 1 and 15-18 years below.
The other factor that drove the bull market in stocks and bonds has been the relentless decline of interest rates from 1980 to 2000. As can be seen in Chart 5 below, since the early 1960s, the earnings yield (the inverse of the price-to-earnings valuation multiple) of the S&P 500 has pretty closely followed the yield of the 10-year treasury bond. Prior to the 1960s, when inflation was very low or even negative, earnings yields were far higher than treasury yields.
Chart 5
Source: economy.com, Standard and Poors, tylernewton.com
As can be seen in Chart 3, in the 1970s, when the value of the dollar plunged and the price of gold rose, stocks did not follow because of the rise in interest rates which provided stiff competition to stocks. As treasury yields rise, the required return from stocks' earnings yield goes up as well. That pattern reversed in 1980. Tighter monetary policy gradually brought down interest rates, but loose fiscal policy kept inflation positive. The combination of falling interest rates and moderately positive inflation is the ideal combination for stock returns.
Now that we are likely shifting to a deflationary environment of falling debt to GDP, we may be seeing a shift to rising earning yields while interest rates remain low. This was the combination that prevailed in the 1930s and 1940s. We are already at a spread between earnings yields and 10-year treasuries not seen since the mid-1950s. If inflation stays as low as it is currently (around 1%), goes lower or even consistently negative, we will very likely see earnings yields back to the level of the early 1950s by the middle to end of this decade.
Rising Asset Values lead to Higher Indebtedness
As asset valuations rose from 1980 to 2008, investors had the opportunity to use financial leverage to supercharge returns. Just witness all the people who made a fortune in real estate over the past thirty years: inflation made the value of rents and real estate rise while financing costs fell. Leveraged buyout practitioners could borrow money and benefit from the combination of rising cash flows and valuation multiples while benefitting from falling interest rates. It's pretty simple. In a thirty-year bull market in asset values for stocks, bonds and real estate, the use of leverage to "get-rich-quicker" is a natural outcome.
The Government has encouraged leveraged speculation
Many of the "supply side" tax policies of the past thirty years have encouraged the use leverage as well. Ostensibly, policies like cuts in upper-end income tax rates, dividend tax rates and capital gains tax rates are meant to encourage savings and investment. In reality, they don't directly encourage savings or investment, they encourage the reward from investment profits. Businesses are the ones that actually invest. If you wanted to directly encourage investment, you would allow for the full deduction of capital expenditures in the year incurred and make the R&D tax credit permanent. If you wanted to directly encourage savings, you would impose consumption taxes or large deductions for money put into investment accounts.
We do, however, directly encourage the use of debt by making interest tax-deductible for businesses and real estate investors, while dividends, on the other hand, are double-taxed at the business and individual level. The government even further subsidized residential real estate interest rates through their "implicit" (now explicit) guarantee on securities issued by the government sponsored entities ("GSEs") Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.
Private equity and real estate investors had this figured out. Take the subsidy for borrowing money and use it to generate subsidized capital gains profits. Benefit from rising asset values as interest rates fell. And benefit from rising cash flows driven by government-generated inflation. In such an environment, it's frankly a wonder we have as little debt as we do.
I bet this makes you wish you had this all figured out in 1982.