How to rebuild the middle class

The COVID-19 pandemic and the related economic shutdowns and fallout has greatly exposed the deep class divisions in our country. The divisions have been there for decades of course. The “hollowing out” of the middle class has been occurring in waves throughout the long period of economic transformation that began in the early 1970s, as the industrial age gave way to the information age. For most of this period, the hollowing out has been explained away by many as the natural forces of economics at work. The pandemic, on the other hand, is a true “Black Swan”, an event exogenous from the economic system, shining a light on our society from a completely different angle than usual.

The vast iniquities are now on full display. The majority of those in the upper reaches of our economic system work from home and home school on broadband connections with adequate savings to stock up on supplies; large businesses serve us via ecommerce and delivery. The fate of the working class is laid bare for all to see: lack of savings, reliance on school for day care and meals, poor access to health care, no sick leave, high fixed costs tied to rent and debt service, jobs that don’t provide benefits even when employed, the risk of bankruptcy in the event of a personal or health crisis. The small proprietor faces many of the same challenges, with the risk of starting a business so high that entrepreneurship in the United States is a record low levels as a percent of the population.

Yes, these issues have been there for a generation or more, but when endogenous to the economic system the meritocratic elite of the country attributes the disparity to a natural outcome of personal choices and talent in the free market for labor. When the trigger is an exogenous shock like COVID-19, the random nature of fate reveals itself to the fortunate as well.

The U.S. government’s historical role in promoting the middle class

The Founders believed that the fate of the Republic lay in the hands of a virtuous middle class (even though that term was not used at the time). From the Founding forward the government of the United States has usually had a program to promote the middle classes. In the beginning the debate was between Alexander Hamilton’s “American System” of protective tariffs, a central bank and funding of internal improvements and Thomas Jefferson’s vision of an agrarian republic built by yeoman farmers. Both systems had influence over the early republic, with Jefferson’s vision having the upper hand through the Civil War and its aftermath. Eventually, when the Republicans took power following the Civil War, Hamilton’s vision won out, with high protective tariffs, the promotion of railroads and industrial development and eventually restrictive immigration to protect workmen’s wages.

During the Great Depression, Franklin Roosevelt’s New Deal promoted unionization for the working class and the beginning of a social safety net in the form of Social Security, supports for farmers, banking regulation, promotion of single family housing and culminating with Medicare under Lyndon Johnson’s Great Society. The economy was dominated by big manufacturing and consumer products companies that, through a quirk of law and history, became the providers of employee benefits: pensions, health insurance, sick leave, paid vacation, etc. Industries tended to be consolidated into a small number of large companies with strong unions and what was effectively regulated or managed competition.

Today’s hybrid system

In the late 1960’s and early 1970’s the New Deal system became harder to maintain. Why this happened is beyond the scope of this essay, but in the effort to advance our economy in the face of competition from our NATO allies and Japan, the government began deregulating industries, finance and the labor markets. As a share of the economy, manufacturing began to decline, and the service industries began to rise. Many of the larger service businesses, particularly those in higher margin industries like finance, technology and entertainment could afford to maintain the old system of company-provided benefits. But many smaller businesses and those in lower margin sectors like retail, hospitality and restaurants could not, especially as benefits like health insurance became more expensive. The post Cold War period of globalization and high levels of low skill immigration brought many benefits but also accelerated the pressure on the U.S. working class.

During the period from the 1970’s to the 2010’s we have maintained the basics of the New Deal system of employer-provided benefits plus certain universal benefits like Social Security, Medicare and unemployment insurance. Many social safety net programs added in the late 1960’s and later, on the other hand, have been non-universal benefits to support those that fall out of the employer-provided benefit system like Medicaid, welfare and food stamps. Because these programs would benefit only subsegments of the population, they have been easy to scapegoat as political payoff for the undeserving and have therefore never been particularly popular among the general public. Hence the relatively low popularity of the Affordable Care Act, while theoretically available to all, is also seen as benefitting only a few at the expense of many.

The tension between employer-provided benefits and non-universal benefits will continue to grow if the current trends are allowed to go on. Free-market conservatives have traditionally disliked non-universal benefits as they are perceived, with some justification, as paying people not to work. But in the highly-globalized, highly-competitive, free-market economy the pressure on margins, wages and benefits faced by businesses outside of technology, finance and certain large enterprises will continue. Couple this with the highest health care costs in the world and the trend toward service economy work and more people will be forced into the haphazard system of non-universal benefits or no benefits at all…a barbell system of a protected upper middle class, a dwindling cadre of manufacturing workers clinging to the Post World War II system in the middle and a growing class of unprotected service workers.

The way forward

To rebuild the middle class we need to both slow the decline of manufacturing work and make service work pay. The economy is going to keep transforming into a service economy whether we like it or not, and that does not mean that the only good jobs need to be in technology and information. There is no reason that we can’t set up a system to put pride and remuneration into service work, no reason we can’t build a solid middle class that includes not only manufacturing, government and health care workers but also waiters, fitness instructors, hairdressers, hospitality workers, retail and wholesale workers, sanitation workers and so on.

The policies needed to build this middle class are all on the table now and being debated individually, but not as a cohesive program. The program would basically be a fusionism between the policies of Trump and Obama:

  • Core protections for U.S. workers
    • Higher minimum wages, so those who work in service businesses make enough to not have to rely on non-universal benefits while employed;
    • Moderate tariff protection, to encourage more production in North America;
    • Restrict low-skill, particularly illegal, immigration, so there is less competition for low wage or off-the-books labor;
  • Encourage key areas of investment
    • Invest in basic infrastructure, to encourage more construction work and make our economy more productive;
    • Encourage more housing construction, particularly in cities and inner suburbs by reforming land use regulations that discourage construction, thereby keeping housing costs reasonable and encouraging construction work;
    • Create an industrial policy for key sectors to move production to the U.S., as the crisis has exposed the weakness that comes from reliance on global supply chains. There is no long-term economic reason that we can’t produce the medical devices, pharmaceuticals, semiconductors, communications equipment, defense goods, auto and aerospace parts, appliances, furniture, capital goods, aluminum and steel that we need in the U.S. or North America;
  • Beef up the social safety net to add universal, portable benefits
    • Build on the Affordable Care Act, mainly the exchanges, to create a system of universal health care that is portable and not employer-based. Health care premia should remain tax-deductible for all, so there is no disparity between employer-based and ACA policies. The Medicaid portion of the ACA should be reduced to encourage liquidity in the exchanges;
    • Build on the 401k system, to provide a universal system of portable savings accounts with policies that encourage savings among the general public;
    • Provide universal day care and pre-school, to reduce the stress on two-income households or single parents;
    • Create a policy of universal sick leave, to prevent workers from having to come to work sick (but being careful to not encourage abuse, which may be difficult) while also reforming the disability insurance system to discourage abuse;
  • Tackle two areas of extreme inflation that are a result of our hybrid system
    • Regulate health care costs, to rein in health care inflation since Americans already pay more for health care than any country in the world;
    • Reform and regulate higher education funding, to reduce indebtedness and rein in higher ed inflation, including adding training credits to the unemployment insurance system;

I have been a free market capitalist my whole life and am well aware of the economic arguments against the programs highlighted above. The economic transformation of the last 50 years has brought many great benefits, including technological innovation, cheaper consumer goods and a huge reduction in poverty around the world. I have also seen the negative side effects as we have created a winner-take-all economy where vast swaths of our country and people are left behind with declining towns, stagnant wages and soaring costs for necessities like health care and education.

How this get paid for will have to be the topic of another essay, but it should be noted that we are paying for most of these things already anyway, and in the case of health care are paying more than other countries that have universal health insurance. Universal social insurance taxes should be preferred, with subsidies from taxes on higher incomes as the secondary form of funding, rather than the other way around. Such a system, as is used in Europe and in the U.S. for Social Security and Medicare, has proven much more durable and popular than making one group of people pay for the other.

I am not calling for an end to the free market, or even globalism, but am calling for a shift in the balance between economic efficiency and looking out for our fellow countrymen. We should be focused on building a middle class for the information age, one based on remunerative work, healthy families and strong communities.

 

 

10 Potential Surprises for 2008 – midyear assessment

In December 2007 I made my 10 potential surprises for 2008 and Predictions post.  I put the odds of each surprise at less than 50/50 at the time and was hoping to get 5 or more right to be able to pat myself on the back as a "soothsayer". 

What I’ve gotten right so far:

4.  The Chinese stock market will crash by more than 30% from its peak.

5.  At some point in 2008, the Fed Funds rate will be at or below 3%.

10.  John McCain will be the Republican presidential nominee.

What I’ve gotten wrong:

1.  The West (namely the US) and Russia will have a major standoff over the fate of Kosovo.  The magnitude of the crisis will surprise the Western media.  Georgia will be sucked into the crisis somehow. [Russia backed down.]

9.  John Edwards will be the Democratic presidential nominee. [no explanation needed]

Jury still out:

2.  The US and North Korea will sign a treaty officially ending the Korean War. [Things are moving in the right direction, not sure if it’ll get this far before the end of the year, though.]

3.  The US and Iran will have a high-profile detente. [I actually think this will happen, but we’re not there yet.]

6.  The US current account deficit will end the year at less than 3% of GDP. [This might happen, but I should have specified Real GDP, which is the most watched measure.]

7.  The US dollar will rally by more than 10% against the Euro and the Pound.  [Not looking good, but in the realm of possibility.]

8.  Russia will effectively merge with Belarus. [What a random prediction…why did I make this?  why would I care about Belarus?]

Moving on to my actual predictions for 2008:

Despite the subprime-driven credit market crisis, 2008 will be a good year for the world economy.  The US will avoid a recession, with economic growth driven by exports and business investment.  The technology and capital goods industrials sectors will do well.  Commodity prices will stay strong, so the mining and oil sectors will also remain strong.  Expect continued M&A in all of these sectors, with the ultimate end game being the formation of global oligopolies.  For these and other reasons, 2008 could actually end up being a good year for the equity markets, but I expect credit risk spreads to remain elevated.

[The world economy is doing ok, but it’s not going to be remembered as a "good" year, I don’t think.  I now doubt we’ll avoid a technical recession, but I continue to believe that the headline number will hold up ok based on the factors I mention above…exports, business investment, matierals, agriculture.  I do not now think it will be a good year for the equity markets…ahem.]

Interest-rate sensitive, consumer-driven sectors will continue to suffer, with autos hit especially hard.  Some time before the end of 2009, it will become obvious that Cerberus’ investment in Chrysler is in serious trouble.  The housing market will continue to weaken, too.  No surprise there.   Housing is in for a long slump.  The huge run up in prices and supply/demand imbalance are bad enough.  Add in declining demographics with the baby boom generation past their home-buying years, and we’re looking at a long, Japan-style real estate deflation.  The demographics are bad for commercial real estate, too.

[I’m liking this paragraph.]

The US current account and budget deficits will continue to narrow.  Because economic growth driven by a narrowing current account deficit doesn’t feel as good as growth driven by a widening deficit, consumer sentiment on the economy will stay low.  High CPI increases will continue, but will likely start slowing markedly near the end of the year.  The US dollar has likely put in an intermediate term bottom in late 2007 and should rise modestly in 2008.

[This is on track, too.  I continue not to be a dollar bear, but my patience is being tested.]

The cracks in the foundation of global growth will really start to show in 2008, particularly in the form of runaway inflation in China and the Petro-states.  China will be forced to clamp down, probably just after or around the time of the Olympics, starting a chain of events that will lead to a real estate and stock market crash.  The problems in the Chinese economy will likely be overshadowed by Olympics hype, however.  In 2009, deflation will start to spread from China to the rest of the world.

[I still believe this to be true.]

All in all I expect the current trends to continue into 2008, but for it to ultimately be a transition year.  I expect 2008 to represent the peak year of the global expansion.

[I’ll stick with this too.]

 

The Dollar is not Weak

Essay: As in late 2004, we witnessed in late 2007 a crescendo of negative sentiment toward the US dollar. With everyone from Warren Buffett and George Soros to Mahmoud Amahdenijad and Hugo Chavez to model Giselle Bundchen and rapper Jay-Z maligning the dropping dollar, it doesn’t take much of a leap of contrarian analysis to call a near-term bottom in the dollar. As with many things, I think more clarity can be derived from stepping back and examining the long-term trend.

Since 1968, when the Bretton Woods gold-linked currency system first started breaking down, the dollar has had remarkably regular long term cycles. From 1968 to 1978, it weakened; from 1978 to 1985, it strengthened; from 1985 to 1995, it weakened; from 1995 to 2002, it strengthened; since 2002 it has weakened. So far each cycle has been 17 years: 6 ½ years up and 10 ½ years down.

The following chart depicts the nominal value of the dollar versus a basket of major trading partners:

The 17 year pattern can be broken into three phases: (i) the fast drop, (ii) the trading range, and (iii) the spike. The fast drop occurs when the dollar falls from an overvalued position, evidenced by a wide current account deficit. The government (Treasury and the Fed) take actions to devalue the dollar, whether it be Nixon’s delinking the dollar from gold in 1971, the Plaza Accord in 1985 or Greenspan’s 1% interest rates in 2003. Usually during the fast drop phase, the US experiences a debt-fuelled LBO/conglomeration boom and a commodity price spike, and the global economy experiences a strong boom. Eventually, however, the Fed and Treasury are forced to take action to defend the dollar and limit inflation. These actions generally result in a market dislocation: the market crash of ’73-’74, the Louvre Accords and the ’87 market crash, the subprime crisis today. An increase in interest rates reduces domestic demand, while the continued low value of the dollar spurs exports, thus resulting in an elimination of the current account deficit.

During the second phase, the dollar trades sideways-to-slightly-down in the long-term channel. During this phase the current account deficit is small and manageable and the real economy does ok. Inflation, however, remains elevated, eventually leading to policies that increase the value of the dollar.

During the third phase the dollar enters a multi-year spike. High real interest rates and overt support from the Treasury draw an inflow of capital from abroad and an increase in the current account deficit. During the boom phase of the dollar spike, you see the US outperform the world economy. The US experiences a venture capital boom and emerging markets are beset by rolling financial crises. Commodity prices fall sharply. The strong dollar and the high current account deficit eventually lead to deflationary pressures, prompting the government to implement policies to devalue the dollar, and the cycle starts all over again.

The chart shows that we are likely at a point similar to early 1973 and 1990, transitioning between the first phase and the second phase of the cycle. If the pattern holds, the dollar should spend the next four years in a sideways-to-higher trading range prior to one last drop to the bottom of the channel. While the economy has fallen into recession during each of the last two similar transitions, each successive crisis appears to be less severe.

The long term channel does slope downward. Plotting the long term trend, the dollar has been falling at a pace of about 0.5% per year since 1973. Why is it ok for the dollar to fall over the long term? Why shouldn’t it rise? A little historical context is in order.

The value of the dollar prior to 1971 was set during the post World War II Bretton Woods conference. At that time, the US economy was the only major economy still intact following the war, and the US possessed around half of the world’s gold reserves. In addition, a huge chunk of the global economy was walled off behind the iron curtain or under self-imposed isolation like India. The economies of postwar Europe and Japan were a shambles, relying on funds from the US to rebuild. Given this situation, it is hardly a surprise that the US economy was so strong in the 1950s and early 1960s, even with high taxes and business regulation. As Japan and Western Europe recovered, however, the strains of international competition and Great Society and Vietnam era deficit spending created balance of payment pressures, leading Nixon to delink the dollar from the gold standard in 1971.

Against a broad basket of currencies, including emerging market currencies, the dollar has increased on a nominal basis since 1971. On a real basis, it has oscillated sideways, generally staying within a range of 84 to 96 (except during spikes). The chart is below:

If the historical pattern holds, the dollar is likely to rebound off today’s levels and trade modestly higher to sideways for the next several years. When the dollar is in the long term trading range, as it is now, the current account deficit has historically narrowed significantly or been eliminated altogether. In addition, considering where it has come from, it can be said that the dollar has held up remarkably well since 1968, relative to other currencies. There are plenty of things to worry about today, but at today’s levels the dollar need not be one of them.

10 Potential Surprises for 2008 & Predictions

Essay: The following 10 surprises are not predictions.  They are 10 potential surprises, the odds of which occuring are underestimated by the current "convential wisdom".  If a few of these come true I will feel pretty smart.  If more than 5 come true, I will proclaim myself a soothsayer.

1.  The West (namely the US) and Russia will have a major standoff over the fate of Kosovo.  The magnitude of the crisis will surprise the Western media.  Georgia will be sucked into the crisis somehow.

2.  The US and North Korea will sign a treaty officially ending the Korean War.

3.  The US and Iran will have a high-profile detente.

4.  The Chinese stock market will crash by more than 30% from its peak. 

5.  At some point in 2008, the Fed Funds rate will be at or below 3%.

6.  The US current account deficit will end the year at less than 3% of GDP.

7.  The US dollar will rally by more than 10% against the Euro and the Pound.

8.  Russia will effectively merge with Belarus.

9.  John Edwards will be the Democratic presidential nominee.

10.  John McCain will be the Republican presidential nominee.

Ok, so I’ll admit that posing my predictions this way is a bit of a cop out in that I don’t have to hang my hat on any of them.  These are my out of the box surprises that I think could happen, but do not put greater than 50/50 odds on any one individually. 

My base case prediction for 2008 is as follows:

Despite the subprime-driven credit market crisis, 2008 will be a good year for the world economy.  The US will avoid a recession, with economic growth driven by exports and business investment.  The technology and capital goods industrials sectors will do well.  Commodity prices will stay strong, so the mining and oil sectors will also remain strong.  Expect continued M&A in all of these sectors, with the ultimate end game being the formation of global oligopolies.  For these and other reasons, 2008 could actually end up being a good year for the equity markets, but I expect credit risk spreads to remain elevated.

Interest-rate sensitive, consumer-driven sectors will continue to suffer, with autos hit especially hard.  Some time before the end of 2009, it will become obvious that Cerberus’ investment in Chrysler is in serious trouble.  The housing market will continue to weaken, too.  No surprise there.   Housing is in for a long slump.  The huge run up in prices and supply/demand imbalance are bad enough.  Add in declining demographics with the baby boom generation past their home-buying years, and we’re looking at a long, Japan-style real estate deflation.  The demographics are bad for commercial real estate, too.

The US current account and budget deficits will continue to narrow.  Because economic growth driven by a narrowing current account deficit doesn’t feel as good as growth driven by a widening deficit, consumer sentiment on the economy will stay low.  High CPI increases will continue, but will likely start slowing markedly near the end of the year.  The US dollar has likely put in an intermediate term bottom in late 2007 and should rise modestly in 2008.

The cracks in the foundation of global growth will really start to show in 2008, particularly in the form of runaway inflation in China and the Petro-states.  China will be forced to clamp down, probably just after or around the time of the Olympics, starting a chain of events that will lead to a real estate and stock market crash.  The problems in the Chinese economy will likely be overshadowed by Olympics hype, however.  In 2009, deflation will start to spread from China to the rest of the world.

All in all I expect the current trends to continue into 2008, but for it to ultimately be a transition year.  I expect 2008 to represent the peak year of the global expansion.   

Assessing the 2008 Presidential Race

Essay: We are in the midst of one of the most wide-open and unpredictable presidential races in modern US history.  Based on my understanding of the American electorate, I believe that the media fundamentally and consistently misreads the electorate due to its inherently cosmopolitan bias.  Before I delve into the candidates, here are what I believe to be the fundamental truths of the electorate (not all of which conform to my personal views, by the way…this is meant to be analysis, not advocacy):

          As a whole, the electorate is sensible and moderate.  The people believe in “strong reciprocity”…that people should be treated equally and fairly.  They favor policies that benefit the hard-working middle class and that reward well-earned success, but come down hard on those, whether rich or poor, that break the rules or are given special benefits.  (i.e. they were happy to see corporate wrong-doers go to jail, they hate “corporate welfare”, they are tough on crime and they disapprove of welfare and affirmative action by wide margins.)

          On average, given the current definitions of “left” and “right”, the American electorate is left-of-center (“LoC”) on economic issues and right-of-center (“RoC”) on social and defense issues (in direct contrast to the media’s presumption that the country is right-of-center on economic issues and left-of-center on social issues).

          In presidential candidates personality matters a lot – the “more likeable” candidate (from the perspective of a political independent) almost always wins.  Being comfortable in one’s own skin and an optimist is of primary importance.

          Even though the electorate is LoC on economic issues, it is fundamentally anti-tax.  The American electorate rarely elects a candidate pledging to raise taxes in any form, and state ballot initiatives to raise taxes to pay for popular programs routinely get voted down, even in the bluest-of-blue states.  If the federal government’s revenue as a percent of GDP exceeds 20%, (it is currently just above 18% of GDP) the electorate will almost always vote for a candidate that runs on a big tax cut.

          While the electorate pays lip service to deficit-reduction as a priority, when it comes time to vote, it is not.

          The electorate has rarely sustained enthusiasm for a conflict that not deemed to be in the national defense, and all wartime presidents have left office in disgrace, as one-termers or dead.  History has generally rehabilitated those that left office alive, with the exceptions of Lyndon Johnson and Richard Nixon.  That said, the electorate is fiercely nationalist and not internationalist in temperament, which makes it more rightist than leftist.

          The Iraq War is not a traditional right-left issue.  There are rightist reasons against the war and leftist reason in favor.  It was hardly a purely “conservative” decision to launch a pre-emptive strike on Iraq and engage in “nation-building” after the conflict.

          Given the current party structure, a Democrat from New England (and potentially NY and NJ) or a Republican from the Deep South states of MS, AL, GA, LA or SC would have a very steep hill to climb to get elected president.

          The electorate’s views are relatively stable.  What changes are the timing of when certain issues rise in importance (i.e. just because the electorate will vote for a cut in taxes when taxes are high, doesn’t mean they are always looking for tax cuts) and the form of the coalitions built by the political parties (the shift on social issues with Republicans going after tradionally-Democratic blue collar workers and the Democrats making inroads with traditionally-Republican suburban voters).

          There is a long economic cycle (~70 years) that affects the general mood of the electorate.  I won’t go into too much detail about that now, but it results in a shift from progressive politics (economic liberalism, increasing social liberalism) to cosmopolitan (increasing economic conservatism, social liberalism) to conservative (economic conservatism, increasing social conservatism) to populist (social conservatism, increasing economic liberalism).  While the 2000 election was fought during the conservative phase, I would argue that that the 2002-2006 elections were fought on more populist themes, many of which were traditional right-wing populist themes.)  The 2008 election will also be fought and won on populist themes.

          The American electorate rarely grants liberals or conservatives unfettered control of government for periods of more than 2 or maybe 4 years.  It never grants unfettered control for more than 6 years, and those 6-year periods have occurred infrequently, but regularly, since the start of the current two-party system (1868-1974 (conservative), 1896-1902 (conservative), 1912-1918 (liberal), 1932-1938 (liberal), 1960-1966 (liberal), 1980-1986 (conservative), 2000-2006 (conservative)).  It should be noted that from the Civil War to the 1980s, the Democratic Party contained both Southern conservatives and Northern liberals.

          Since the Civil War, with the exception of the period between 1932 and 1968, the Republican Party has had a natural and underestimated advantage in presidential races.  This is a vestige of the Civil War, where the Republican Party was the Union Party and the Democrats were the opposition.  Since that time, the Republicans have generally felt that they kept the flame of American tradition on defense, social issues and economics (although the definition of those traditions have changed over time), and the Democrats have usually been structured as an array of special interests that oppose the Republican agenda.  (That is evident even now, where the Democratic platform, with the exception of health care, is mostly an anti-Bush platform.)  The exception came in the 1930s when the Republican Party’s advantage collapsed during the FDR years of the Depression and World War II and the Democrats could more or less unite on economic issues.  The Democratic coalition fell apart in the late 1960s when the pressure on social and defense issues overwhelmed the glue that held them together on economics.

          It should be noted that only two Democratic candidates since the Civil War have received 51% or more of the vote.  Those are FDR in four elections and LBJ in one.  Republican presidents have almost always won at least 51% of the vote in one of their elections.

          The Democrats can build winning coalitions on economic issues while downplaying social and defense issues.  Democratic candidates from the South can win because they can eat into the Republicans advantage in that region.  (LBJ, Carter and Clinton)

Ok, through that lens, here’s how I judge the electability of the candidates, based on positioning of canididates and personality:

Democrats

          Clinton – LoC on social issues, Centrist (“C”) on economics & defense, weak personality

          Obama – LoC on all issues; strong personality

          Edwards – LoC on economics, C on social issues, historically C on defense, but now positioned as LoC; ok to strong personality (I would say ok, but as a Southerner he has an advantage)

          Richardson – C on all issues (I think); strong personality

          Biden – LoC on social and economic issues, C on defense; ok to strong personality (I like him, but he talks too much for his own good…like me)

          Dodd – LoC on all issues; strong personality

Republicans

          Giuliani – RoC on economics and defense, LoC on social; ok to weak personality

          Romney – RoC on all issues (recently, at least); ok personality

          Thompson – RoC on all issues; strong personality if he can break out of his shell

          McCain – RoC on social and defense; C on economics; ok to strong personality (hindered by his age)

          Huckabee – RoC on social and defense, C on economics; strong personality

          Paul – Quirky…while he claims to be a libertarian, he strikes me more as an old-school right wing populist (an isolationist, anti-immigration, anti-trade, hard money advocate, anti-Washington, anti-elitist tradition in various strains from Andrew Jackson to Calvin Coolidge to Patrick Buchanan)

As I believe we are in a populist, and not a conservative era, the parties would benefit from nominating candidates that move both parties to the left on economic issues and the Democrats to right on social issues.  A nationalist, but centrist, foreign policy would be the most appealing to the electorate as well.  I therefore view the strongest general election candidates to be John Edwards on the Democratic side and Mike Huckabee on the Republican side.  I would give a runner-up mentions to Bill Richardson (who I don’t believe can win the nomination at this point) and John McCain.  In a general election, I would expect John Edwards to beat all Republicans with the possible exception of John McCain.  I would expect Huckabee, McCain or Fred Thompson to beat Hillary Clinton or Barack Obama.  Any other combination would be utterly unpredictable. 

Hillary Clinton and Rudy Giuliani are far weaker candidates for the general election than they appear; both are hindered by their personalities and positions on social issues.  Giuliani’s economic plans are pure Republican orthodoxy and don’t offer innovative ideas for the middle-class (even Bush had the faith-based initiative and no-child-left-behind to soften the edges), and the same goes for Thompson and Romney.  Giuliani is out-of-step with the electorate on economic and social issues, is a super-hawk on defense and can have an erratic and acerbic personality, which I don’t believe is a winning combination.  I think Hillary Clinton may be a stronger candidate than Rudy Giuliani, in fact, with the tiebreaker going to her carefully-cultivated reputation as a centrist on economics and foreign policy, partially offset by his modest advantage in personality and heroic reputation.